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Summary  findings
Developing  countries  experienced  a revolution  in trade  tended  to "peel  away"  redundant  layers  of trade  barriers,
policy  in the  1980s  and  1990s,  but  it is unclear  how  one at a time.  They  usually  began  with  the  barriers
much  real  openness  increased.  After  all, they  had  started  embodied  in rationing  and exchange  controls,  proceeded
with  multiple,  often  redundant,  trade  restrictions.  And  it  to nontariff  measures,  and  finally  reduced  tariffs.  Each
is unclear  how  changes  in openness  should  be measured.  step  may have  reduced  protection  a bit  but  the big
The  most  appropriate  measure  of openness  is based  on  reductions  apparently  came only  in later  stages.  Still,
imports  of consumer  goods,  argue  Andriamananjara  and  even  gradual  reform  helped  open  up those  economies.
Nash,  since  these  imports  commonly  face the  biggest  The Asian  countries  tended  to be most  open  both  early
trade  barriers.  After developing  several  such  measures,  and  late. They  were  also  above-average  in reform  efforts,
including  a measure  of the change  in tariff  equivalent  by some measures,  so their  strong  growth  performance
protection,  they  explore  the  recent  evolution  of trade  (based  on exports)  was unsurprising.
policy,  using  readily  available  trade  data.  The  African  countries,  whose  trade  policies  were
Openness  has developed  incrementally  rather  than  probably  worst  to begin with,  made  relatively  modest
overnight.  In  the early stages  of adjustment,  barriers  to  progress  initially.  In  recent  years  their  progress  has been
imports  tended  not  to be reduced  much.  At first,  the  net  substantial;  whether  they  have  improved  as much  as
reduction  of incentives  to produce  import  substitutes  was  other  countries  depends  on which  measure  is used.
minor,  especially  when  currency  depreciation  is  Countries  tied  to the  French  franc  (for whom  real
considered.  Recently  import  barricrs  have been  reduced  devaluation  was more  difficult)  showed  less progress
more  substantially,  and  since there  has been  little  than  nonfranc  countries,  illustrating  the  importance  of
currency  depreciation,  incentives  to produce  import  the  connection  between  devaluation  and trade  reform.
substitutes  have  declined.  There  is no evidence  that  rapid  trade  reform  resulted
Shock  therapy  was uncommon.  A few  countries  moved  in Africa's  de-industrialization.
quickly  to  eliminate  nontariff  barriers  to imports  and  to
adopt  low,  fairly uniform  tariffs.  But most  countries
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Evidence from Readily Available Trade Data
I.  Introduction
Measuring a country's degree of integration in the world economy and how this changes
over time is important', but tricky.  The main reason it is difficult to do is that there are a wide
array of policy instruments used to affect trade, both imports and exports.  In the simplest possible
case, a uniform tax or subsidy on imports or exports with no other restrictions, measurement
would be relatively simple. A reasonable measure of integration or ("openness") would be the
rate of the tax or subsidy. 2 Apart from Hong Kong and Singapore, which are virtual free trade
zones, no developing countries in the world have such a simple trade regime, though some come
close (e.g., Chile). In the more common case of a non-uniform trade tax structure, the task is
more formidable since even with the same average rate, the effect on trade will differ, depending
on which goods are taxed at high rates and which at low.  But the task is in almost all cases even
more complex than this because all but a few countries use other, often multiple, barriers in
addition to taxes.  These commonly have included foreign exchange rationing, import licensing
requirements, reference prices, domestic content requirements, and export licensing requirements.
Recently, developing countries have even begun to follow the example of industrial countries and
use antidumping actions to restrict imports.
'  World  Bank  (1995)  shows  how important  integration  is for developing  countries.
2  Even in this case, however, things are not completely  straightforward. How much trade is affected by a given tax
depends in part on structural characteristics of the  economy, such as the  substitutability and complementarity  among
nontradables,  importables,  and exportables  (Sjastaad  and Clements).Given these multiple dimensions of trade restrictiveness, it is not surprising that there is no
consensus on what constitutes the best, or even a reasonable, measure of openness. Many
different measures have been used by different investigators.  Baldwin (1989) correctly notes that
measures of openness can either  be  based on outcome or incidence. The former infers
information on the policy-induced  trade barriers from data on the variables they presumably affect
(prices or trade flows), while the latter are constructed from data on the actual barriers
themselves.
The simplest outcome-based measure is the ratio of trade (usually imports plus exports) to
GDP.  Since this can be affected by structural characteristics of the economy, as well as external
factors that affect the cost of trading (e.g., location, external transport links, etc.), more
sophisticated analyses use the ratio adjusted for at least some of these factors.  (See, for example,
Balassa (1985), or section IV of the current chapter for a more detailed explanation.) Leamer
(1988) has taken this technique one step further by constructing Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek style
factor endowment models that predict what would be a country's composition (not just volume)
of trade without intervention, then using the average deviation of the actual from predicted values
as a measure of openness or intervention 3. One obvious problem with this approach is that the
results are only reliable to the extent that the model used to form the counterfactual incorporates
all the relevant determinants of trade.  Another shortcoming is that these measures only capture a
country's deviation from the cross-country average level (or, in the case of the Leamer index, the
normal pattern) of trade restrictions.  Thus, they can be thought of as relative, rather than absolute
measures.
3  Leamer  uses the deviation  of actual from predicted  volume  of trade as measure of openness,  and the deviation  of actual
from  predicted  trade pattern  as a measure  of intervention.
2Other outcome-based measures are import penetration ratios.  These are intended only to
indicate restrictions on imports and come in two flavors, one using the ratio of imports to GDP,
the other the ratio of imports to aggregate consumption. The latter is probably a more reliable
indicator of  restrictive trade policy than the latter since in most developing countries, it is imports
of consumption goods that are the most stringently restricted.  However, using total imports to
calculate this ratio implicitly  assumes at a minimum  that the proportion of consumer imports in
total imports is the same across countries and time, so that the reason for a lower ratio it can be
inferred to be tighter restrictions, rather than differences in the  composition of imports.
The third generic variety of outcome-based measures are those calculated from a
comparison of domestic and border prices of similar products.  Where these can be calculated,
they have the advantage (compared to some other measures, such as the average tariff rate)  of
capturing the effects of nontariff barriers, as well as tariffs.  They also are easier to interpret
economically  than are some other quantity-based measures, which is one reason measures of this
genre were used in the Uruguay Round negotiations. The major disadvantage of these measures
is that they require data that are not readily available in many developing countries. Domestic
prices of individual  goods must be compared to the border prices of those same goods, adjusted
for transport costs, distribution markups, and (unless the goods are exactly the same) quality
differences. This kind of exercise is difficult and time-consuming, and has been carried out for
few developing countries on a regular basis.  Some investigations (World Bank, 1991) have used
national accounts price index data to measure domestic vis a vis international prices. Differences
between the domestic price of tradables relative to international norms are taken to indicate
distortions in the trade regime.  Apart from the crude nature of price comparisons from national
accounts data, this kind of  index has the shortcoming that trade restrictions will be
underestimated in a country with a trade policy (typical in developing countries) of taxing both
3imports and exports.  In this case, the prices of importables are raised above world levels, while
those of exportables are depressed.  When the "average deviation" is measured across all
tradables, the negatives offset the positives, and the index may be small even though the
distortions are quite large.
A final class of outcome-based measure uses the exchange rate.  The black market
premium is sometimes used to indicate stringency of trade restrictions.  This is a reasonable proxy
for the excess demand for foreign exchange.  However, demand for imports outside of official
channels is only one source of excess demand for foreign exchange.  The other major source is
capital flight, which can create a high premium when the capital account is not open, even in an
economy with a relatively open current account with few barriers.  Another measure is movement
in the real exchange rate.  Trade restrictions appreciate the real exchange rate.  While it is difficult
to estimate the equilibrium  real exchange rate level, it is clear that a trade liberalization will
depreciate this level. Thus a real depreciation can be used to infer liberalization. 4
Measures of import restrictions based on incidence of  trade policy instruments include
average tariff rates and indexes of non-tariff measures. Average tariffs can be measured as the
average statutory tariff (unweighted or weighted by import shares or production shares) or as the
average collection rate, calculated as the ratio of import duties collected to value of imports. The
collection rate seems more appealing at first blush, since legal rates do not mean much when there
are widespread exemptions or smuggling. But collection rates may be misleading,  especially when
exemptions are concentrated in goods that do not compete with domestic production and in
imported inputs, as is common in developing countries. In such cases, this "escalated structure"
(high rates on competing imports and low rates on inputs) can produce a low to moderate
4  Alternatively,  the real exchange  rate can be considered  a trade policy  variable  in the short run. On this interpretation,  a
depreciation  is an incidence,  rather than an outcome,  measure.
4collection rate, but high effective protection.  For this reason, an average of statutory rates,
preferably weighted by production shares, is probably the best of the tariff-based measures. A
critical weakness of any measure based on tariffs is that the typical trade regime of developing
countries restricts imports with other barriers. For many products, the tariffs are redundant, that
is, they do not provide any additional protection for domestic producers.  The tariff level is
therefore not a good indicator of trade policy.
To remedy this shortcoming, measures of  the prevalence of nontariff barriers are used.
(See, for example, Erzan, et al (1989) and Laird and Yeats (1988)).  These are usually  just the
number of product categories imports of which are subject to some kind of barrier divided by the
total number of product categories in the classification scheme being used.  Sometimes the
numbers are weighted by import share or share in domestic production.  The production-weighted
index is probably the most useful as an indicator of how much the NTBs protect domestic
industry.  But even this is not very reliable, since the actual effect of the NTBs varies a lot across
products and across countries, and this kind of index cannot show which are binding (and how
much these raise domestic prices) and which are not.
Anderson and Neary have recently developed a "trade restrictiveness index", which in
principle incorporates the effects of both tariffs and NTBs.  Because of this, it is arguably the
most theoretically defensible of any single measure. However, in the absence of domestic price
data, empirical application requires assumptions about the effects of NTBs, and the results are
sensitive to what assumptions are made.
The goal of the remainder of this chapter is to measure changes in trade restrictiveness
(sections II and III) or the level of relative restrictiveness (section IV), using data which is
published and readily available for most countries. In one sense, measuring the change is a more
5modest goal than measuring trade restrictiveness per se.  But for many purposes, the change is the
more relevant issue.
Most of the measures reported in parts II and III are based on import penetration.
However, unlike previous studies, this chapter uses various measures of consumption imports.
The reason for this is simple: most countries use trade barriers to protect domestic production,
and most domestic production in developing countries is concentrated in consumer goods.
Changes in protection, therefore, should be more reliably measured by changes in this subset than
by changes in total imports.  Also, many countries treat food and fuel imports differently  from
manufactures, and impose few barriers and low tariffs on these products.  For this reason, food or
fuel imports are omitted from imports in some of the measures.
All of these measures were computed for a sample of  88 developing countries (listed in
Appendix 1). Most of these countries were recipients of policy-based loans with significant  trade
policy components from the World Bank or IMF.  The changes in the openness indicators are
measured over two different periods for these trade adjustment loan (TAL) countries.  In the
tables below, for each variable, the "After" column shows the difference between the average of
the 3 years after the first trade-related adjustment loan, compared to the average of the 3 years
before the loan. The "Recent" column shows the change from the 3 years before the loan,
compared with the most recent 3 years for which data is available, generally ending in 1992. For
the countries that did not receive a trade adjustment loan before 1992 the comparison is the 3
most recent years versus 1980-82.
II.  Indirect Indicators
The methodology used here follows Nash (1993), where it is applied to a sample of
African countries.  Table 1 reports the movements in seven trade related variables. Average and
6median values of the movements are taken for five regions. Within each region, countries are
grouped as Trade Adjustment  Lending (TAL) countries or Non Trade Adjustment Lending
(NTAL), as explained above. The countries in each region and in each sub-group are listed in the
Appendix I.  Comparing the "After" column to the "Recent" column indicates whether the
variable has continued to move in the same direction in recent years, or has changed direction.
For non-TAL countries, both columns are the same, and are based on the difference between the
average value in most recent 3 years and the average for 1980-82.
The first four columns of Table 1 show the change in the real effective exchange rate
(REER) and the black market premium (BMP) on exchange rate. Ceteris paribus, trade
liberalization is expected to decrease these variables. On average, and within each region, TAL
developing countries devalued their currencies in real terms, while NTAL countries (except in
SSA) showed appreciation of their currencies..  Almost all groups show increasing openness
("recent" smaller than "after"). The only exception is the TAL subgroup for Europe, where there
was a devaluation in "after" followed by a real appreciation in "recent". This result was mainly
influenced  by Hungary, the real exchange rate of which appreciated in response to inflows of
foreign capital.
The BMP fell in TALs, on average, but increased in Non-TALs. Nevertheless, as the small
median figures for non-TALs show, there were about as many non-TAL countries where the
BMP increased as decreased. For almost all groups, the "recent" is smaller than "after", indicating
continuing decline in the BMP. The greatest decreases were found in some African countries.
The remaining  columns in Table 1 report the behavior of five different measures of import
penetration in the domestic market. Imports as a fraction of GDP (M/GDP) increased for TALs
but decreased for NTALs on average, as expected. Also, the data show  an intensification of the
import liberalization  ("recent" greater than "after") for each group.
7The next two variables are Consumer Imports as a percentage of Imports (CM/M), and
Non Food consumer imports as a fraction of Non Food Imports (NFCM/NFM). These variables
tell the same stories. Almost all groups and subgroups show increases in CM/M and NFCM/NFM.
Comparing the "after" to "recent" columns, data for both variables indicate that import
liberalization has intensified  in most recent years ("recent" greater than "after") for almost all
groups.
The last two variables are identical to the previous two, with the only difference  being that
the denominator is total consumption (CM/Con and NFCM/Con). Increasing shares of (non food)
consumer imports in total consumption would indicate reduced protection. On average,
developing countries show  positive figures for both CM/Con and NFCMlCon. In all groups,
except for EU-TALs, the "recent" figure is greater than the "after" one, indicating an
intensification  of the liberalization.
To sum up, on average, all the computed indicators show more openness in developing
countries (negative changes for REER and BMP, and positive changes for M/GDP, CM/M,
NFCM/NFM, CM/Con, and NFCM/Con). Moreover,  each indicator shows a further decrease in
protection in the most recent years.  That is, the "recent" figure is more negative for REER and
BMP, and more positive for M/GDP, CM/M, NFCM/NFM, CM/Con, and NFCM/Con.
Ill.  Ouantitative measures of movements in protection rates
This section quantifies the changes in trade policy in ways that can be more easily given an
economic interpretation. One way of quantifying the effects of  nontariff import barriers is to
estimate the tariff that would produce the same effect, known as the "tariff equivalent' of the
NTBs.  Section a) below uses the methodology of Nash (1993) to estimate changes in the tariff
equivalents. Section b) addresses the question of what has happened to the incentives of
8producers of import substitutes. This is an important question which has relevance, for example,
to the allegation that there has been de-industrialization in Africa caused by overly rapid trade
reforms.
a/  Tariff equivalent of import restrictions (%t5(1+t))
The change in the tariff equivalent is calculated using the following import demand
equation:
where M is imports in quantity terms, Y is income, PM  is import price in dollars, E is the real
exchange rate, and (1+t) is the "tariff equivalent" of import restrictions. Taking logarithms,
differentiating both sides, and re-arranging the terms shows that:
%6(1+t)={%oM-b%6Y-c[%6PM+%6E] }/c,
where %6 is the percentage change in a variable, and b and c are the import elasticities with
respect to income and price. The values of these elasticities are fixed at b=1.25 and c=-l.  Ideally,
the elasticities would have been estimated for each country. However, when this was tried, the
coefficients were highly variable, and often implausible  in magnitude or of the wrong sign, at least
partially due to the short data series available. The values used here are consistent with the range
of values for these parameters estimated for a broad range of developing countries in other studies
(see Pritchett (1987) and De Rosa (1992)).
The results of the exercise are largely consistent across the different definitions of imports
used. In fact, results for each definition of imports are correlated to those of the others at the 0.90
level. The main results are summarized in Table 2. On average, developing countries (Tal and
Non-TAL) had a decrease in  (%6(1+t)) for each definition of imports. The tariff equivalent fell
921 percent following the beginning of the adjustment process, and an additional 26 percent since
then.  Almost all regions and subgroups tell the same story, though the size of the decrease varies
substantially.  Latin America shows the largest reduction "After" by all measures, and by 2 of
the 3 measures, the largest "Recent" reduction as well. The only major exception is the MENA
region which by some measures shows  increases in protection.  For all definitions of imports and
for all regions, the "recent" average is  smaller (more negative) than the "after" one, indicating
that protection has continued to decrease.  One anomaly, and inconsistency with the results in
Table 1, is the large reduction in the tariff equivalent protection in the NTAL countries.
b/Incentivesfor  importable production  (%06(1+t)+%,5REER)
Incentives for producing import substitutes depend not only on protection through
commercial policy, but also on the real exchange rate.  The change in incentives is estimated by
adding (%6REER) to the estimated value of (%6(1+t)).  Since this is derived directly from the
data used above, it should not be interpreted as an independent indicator of trade policy.
On average, developing countries showed a decrease in the variable for each definition of
imports, though the "After" reduction is only on the order of 3 to 7 percent, while the "Recent"
reduction is between 20 and 30 percent.  Almost all regions and subgroups tell qualitatively the
same story, though some show small increases in the "After" column. The only major exceptions
are the MENA-Non-TAL subgroup which  shows a large  increase, and the Asia TAL sub-group,
which shows a moderate increase. Moreover, for all definitions of imports and for all regions, the
"recent" average is  smaller (more negative) than the "after" one, indicating more reduction in
incentives for import substitute production in recent years.  In sub-Saharan Africa, where the
allegations of deindustrialization  caused by overly rapid reform have been loudest, the evidence
here indicates that incentives increased modestly during the beginning of the adjustment process,
10then began to fall, with the net effect through 1992 being a reduction in incentives by around 18
percent.
The evidence here shows that for most countries, especially  the trade reformers, incentives
for producing import substitutes were reduced only modestly at the beginning of the adjustment
process, and in many cases were improved by the combination of commercial policy reforms and
devaluation.  This is one reason why a substantial devaluation seems to be a key ingredient of
most successful trade reforms, because it buffers the immediate negative impact on the import
substitute sector.  This observation is not new, but it is interesting to see here the quantitative
significance of the point.  Of course, in more recent years, the continually falling protection has
resulted in a more significant  reduction in incentives to produce in previously highly protected
sectors, as would be expected.
11IV.  Measures Based on Structural Models
An alternative measure of policy-induced trade openness of a country is the deviation of
the volume or composition of its trade from the predicted value of the variable in the absence of
restrictions.  The way this idea is usually empirically  implemented is to estimate a structural model
of the determinants of trade using cross-country data, then plug in the relevant values of the
country's  data to derive the predictions.  The structure of the model is the major difference among
the studies that have used this class of measures. Leamer (1988), for example, used a Heckscher-
Ohlin model in which trade flows are determined by resource endowments. Others have used
models in which the relevant determinants are other characteristics of the economy, such as per
capita income, size, and proxies for transport costs.  Here, the latter approach is used.  A
modified gravity model of non-mineral export trade similar to that used by Balassa and Bauwens
(1987) is estimated.  The variables affecting trade in this model are income per capita, total
population, mineral exports  and distance from the 5 most important export markets. The latter
two variables are intended, respectively, to capture the "Dutch disease" phenomenon and to
represent propinquity to markets and therefore transport costs. Two models are estimated, one
using as the dependent variable non-mineral exports per capita and the other using exports as a
percentage of GDP, for the two periods 1980-82 and 1990-92. The year 1992 was the last for
which all relevant data were available for the sample countries.
Per Capita Model (PC):
LNXCAPi = a, + a, LGDPCAP, +  a 2 LNPOP, +  a3 XMCAP,  + a4 WDIST,
12Percentage of GDP Model (PG):
LNXGDPI = a, + a, LGDPCAP, +  a 2 LNPOP, + a3 XMGDP,  + a4 WDIST,
where:
LNXCAP,: Per Capita non mineral exports (in log) of country i,
LNXGDPi: Non Mineral exports as a percentage of GDP (in log);
LGDPCAP,: Log of per capita GDP,
LNPOPi: Population (in log);
XMCAP,: Mineral exports per capita;
XMGDP,: Mineral exports as a percentage of GDP;
WDIST,: Weighted distance from five most important export partners.
Expected coefficient signs: a, > 0,  a 2 <  0,  a 3 < 0 a4 > 0i
The full regression results for each model, as well as the sources used for the data, can be
found in Appendices 2 and 3. In general, except for the weighted distance 5, the regression
coefficients were significant  at 90 percent level using a one-tail test, and had their expected signs.
The goodness of fit for the regressions (Adj R-sq) range from 0.28 to 0.71, which is acceptable
for this kind of cross country regression.
Percentage deviations of actual from hypothetical values of the dependent variable are
used as an indicator of trade orientation. Positive (negative) figures are taken to represent a low
(high) degree of restrictiveness. The countries in the sample are ranked by these deviations, taking
the country with the largest deviation (lowest restrictiveness) as number one. The results show a
positive correlation (at 0.84) between the rankings from the PC model and from the PG model.
To see the change over time in the ranking of a country relative to the others in the
sample, the 1990-92 rankings were subtracted from the 1980-82 rankings. A  positive figure
means an improvement in the rankings, that is, greater openness, relative to the others.  Note that
this sheds no light on the question of how developing countries' trade policies changed in absolute
S  As Pritchett (1991) notes, proxies for transport costs have had a mixed record in these structural trade flow
models.
13terms, either individually  or collectively, but rather shows only the changes of individual countries
or sub-groups relative to the sample as a whole.
Keeping in mind that 1 is most open, and that a positive change in the rankings indicates
an improvement, Table 4 gives an summary of the results. For both models, the results show that
Asia was the only region that had  lower (i.e. more open) average rankings  than the whole
sample. Half of the Asian sample are ranked 13th or better. In 1990-92, the data show that on
average, trade adjustment lending (TAL) countries are more open than Non-TALs (with the
exception of  Asia in the PC model).
Between the two periods, Asia (AS),  Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Sub
Saharan Africa (SSA) show improvements in average rankings. On the other hand, Europe (EU)
and Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) dropped. The table also shows that in AS, MENA, and
SSA, Trade Adjustment Lending countries had greater changes in average rankings (i.e., showed
more improvements) than NTALs.  In LAC and EU, the reverse was true, though the TAL
countries still ranked ahead of their non-adjusting counterparts.
V.  Correlation between different openness indicators
One would expect a negative correlation between the changes in the "exchange rate"
variables (REER and BMP) and the movement in the different measures of import penetration
(MIGDP, CM/M, NFCM/NFM, CM/Con, and NFCM/Con), and a positive correlation among the
latter group.  However, no such correlations were found to be above the 0.40 level.  The only
strong  correlation  (using both  Pearson  and  Spearman coefficients) that  could  be  found  was
between very similar variables such as CM/IM  and NFCMINFM, or CM/Con and NFCM/Con.
These results may seem surprising, but are consistent with those of Pritchett (1991), who found
14that  a  wide  spectrum  of  measures  of  openness,  independently  developed  by  numerous
investigators, were uncorrelated.
VI.  Conclusions
The lack of correlation notwithstanding, the several measures of changes in trade policy
reported  in the current chapter tell very similar stories about what happened in the  1980s and
early  1990s.  Sections II  and III  show that  developing countries on the whole  have become
significantly more open.  However, this process  was incremental, rather  than abrupt in  most
countries. The barriers to imports were not reduced much on average in the early stages of the
adjustment process.  In fact, when the  currency depreciations are taken  into account, the net
effect was to  reduce very little, if at all, the incentives to  produce import substitutes. But  the
evidence shows that import barriers have been reduced more substantially in recent years.  Since
this  has  not  been  accompanied by large  real  depreciation  of  currencies,  as  occurred  at  the
beginning of the adjustment process, the overall incentives for import substitute production in
most countries in recent years seem to be  substantially lower than they were before adjustment
programs began.
The evidence here is broad brush in nature,  so there are certainly exceptions.  But the
finding that trade  policy reform has been a  gradual  process  in most  developing countries is
consistent with case studies of a number of countries.  A few countries, including Chile in the
1970s and Mexico in the 1980s, undertook rapid elimination of non-tariff barriers to imports and
moved quickly to  regimes of very low and fairly uniform tariffs.  But  in most  countries, the
pattern was one of "peeling away" the redundant layers of trade barriers one at a time.  This
usually began with the barriers embodied in exchange controls and rationing, proceeded with the
non-tariff measures, then finally reduced  the tariff  structure.  Each  of  these  steps may have
15reduced actual protection a bit, but the evidence implies that the big reductions only come in the
later stages. Thus, it appears that  "shock therapy" has not been as common as is sometimes
alleged, at least in trade policy reforms.  At the same time, it is reassuring to see that by a number
of measures, the reform efforts have had an impact, albeit gradual, in opening up the economies of
developing countries.
The evidence here is also instructive for what it shows about relative openness and
intensity of reform.  The Asian countries in the sample were on average the most open both in the
early and later periods (section IV) and also showed above-average reform effort by the measures
in  sections II and IV (though not in section III).  Based on this, their well-known strong growth
performance based on exports is not surprising. The African countries, which began the
adjustment period with arguably the worst trade policies (see Nash (1993) and Foroutan (1993)),
made relatively modest progress at first.  Their progress in recent years has been substantial,
though whether they have  improved on average as much as other developing countries depends
on which measure is used. Section IV indicates a very small relative improvement in their ranking.
When the African sample is broken into countries whose currencies were tied to the French franc
(and for whom real devaluation was more difficult) and those that were not, the latter countries
showed more progress in trade reform.  This emphasizes the importance of the relation between
successful trade policy reform and devaluation. In any case, there seems to be no evidence here to
support the charges that rapid trade policy reform resulted in de-industrialization in Africa.
16Table  1: Performance of trade policy-related economic variables
REER  BMP  M/GDP  CM/M  NFCM/NFM  CM/CON  NFCICON
After  Recent  ARer  Recent  Afte  r  Rr|  Recent  After  Recet  After  |Recent  Aler  Recent
Average
Dev.  -10.13  -16.47  -15.36  -21.64  0.42  2.20  0.66  1.20  0.95  1.78  0.01  2.46  0.18  2.27
TAL  -19.43  -26.59  -23.18  -32.51  1.05  3.53  -0.14  0.62  0.15  1.31  -0.05  3.23  -0.01  2.78
NTAL  12.51  4.36  -1.27  2,68  2.99  0.19  0.76
Asia  5.20  -2.74  9.79  3.50  0.37  1.62  1.02  1.45  2.34  3.07  1.17  2.59  1.66  3.03
TAL  -7.08  -21.83  -2.63  -14.31  -1.35  0.97  -1.69  -0.90  -1.23  0.13  -1.12  1.53  -0.61  1.92
NTAL  19.52  24.27  2.37  4.18  6.50  3.83  4.32
Europe  1.11  5.75  -22.56  -33.93  1.23  1.94  3.91  7.99  4.28  7.80  0.90  1.18  1.04  1.37
TAL  -4.18  3.54  -29.49  -50.76  1.51  2.78  -0.08  6.05  -0.16  5.12  -0.74  -0.81  -0.49  -0.45
NTAL  9.06  -8.70  0.67  11.87  13.16  4.18  4.10
LAC  5.65  2.55  -16.66  -29.01  1.32  4.81  0.96  1.30  1.34  1.93  -0.21  5.65  -0.12  4.28
TAL  -12.42  -16.14  -15.43  -31.33  1.06  5.71  0.85  1.31  1.74  2.53  -0.34  7.46  -0.03  5.84
NTAL  96.00  -21.50  2.12  1.29  0.12  0.20  -0.39
MENA  -10.74  -11.43  4.23  4.83  5.19  5.22  2.43  2.20  3.03  3.67  1.96  1.72  1.54  2.09
TAL  -30.05  -31.20  -11.26  -10.36  7.97  8.01  0.49  0.07  1.38  2.49  5.53  5.18  3.86  4.68
NTAL  18.23  35.19  - -5.94  5.03  5.24  -5.20  -3.10
SSA  -24.25  -34.23  -24.99  -29.71  -0.82  0.57  -0.55  -0.30  -0.77  -0.18  -0.86  0.69  -0.65  0.83
TAL  -26.77  40.54  -32.08  -38.82  0.61  2.44  -0.38  -0.07  -0.49  0.23  -0.33  1.47  -0.33  1.39
NTAL  !  -17.20  -1.38  -.6.01  -1.42  -2.15  -4.59  -2.90
All Figures denote change in the variable, except REER figures, which are percentage change, and Average level figures which are in percentage.
REER: Real Effetive Exchange rate, BMP: Black market premium, M: Total imports, CM: Consumption Imports (food, textiles, and other
manufactures). NFCM:  Non food consumption imports, NFM: Non food imports; TAL:  Trade Adjustment  Lending Countries, NTAL: Non
Trade Adjustment Lending Countries,  LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean, MENA  Middle East and North Africa, and SSA  Sub Saharan
Africa. See text for definitions of the "after 'and  "recent" columns.  See Appendix for Data definitions and sources.
Table 2: Change in tariff equivalent of imports restrictions (% (1+t))
Cons  Imp  Non  Food  Cons  Imp  Non  Fuel  Imp
After  Recent  After  Recent  After  Recent
Average
Dev Countries  -21.05  47.67  -24.73  -55.04  -22.49  -51.03
TAL  -11.99  -44.88  -14.05  -51.50  -12.95  -48.07
NTAL  -59.53  -70.10  -63.82
ASIA  -2.84  -16.26  -15.43  -34.77  -9.62  -28.93
TAL  23.81  0.81  21.38  -11.78  20.32  -12.78
NTAL  -40.16  -66.95  -51.53
EUROPE  -32.50  -114.75  -32.04  -103.41  -33.47  -112.14
TAL  -32.50  -114.75  -32.04  -103.41  -33.47  -112.14
NTAL  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.
LAC  -33.99  -55.64  -36.90  -62.09  -35.85  -60.35
TAL  -11.25  -37.24  -15.78  -46.01  -14.32  43.71
NTAL  -147.69  -142.46  -143.51
MENA  27.28  12.08  15.85  -12.33  23.96  5.61
TAL  10.57  -9.70  -1.31  -38.89  6.24  -18.23
NTAL  77.41  67.34  77.11
SSA  -26.60  -58.09  -26.00  -60.51  -24.96  -56.23
TAL  -23.64  -59.24  -23.03  -62.04  -21.63  -56.81
NTAL  -49.29  48.79  1  -51.59
TAL:  Trade  Adjustment  Lending  Countries,  NTAL:  Non  Trade  Adjustment  Lending  Countries, LAC:  Latin  America  and the  Caribbean,
MENA: Middle East and North Africa, and SSA: Sub Saharan Africa.  See Appendix for Data definitions and  sources.
17Table 3: Change in incentives for importable prod  ction
Cons Imp  Non Food Cons Imp  Non Fuel Imp
After  Recent  After  Recent  After  Recent
Average
Dev Countries  -2.85  -22.19  -6.53  -29.57  -4.58  -25.95
TAL  1.13  -22.76  -0.93  -29.38  -0.07  -26.38
NTAL  -19.80  -30.37  -24.10
ASIA  5.61  -1.47  -6.97  -19.98  -1.16  -14.14
TAL  17.45  5.30  15.01  -7.29  13.95  -8.29
NTAL  -10.95  -37.74  -22.32
EUROPE  -30.48  -98.20  -30.02  -86.86  -31.44  -95.59
TAL  -30.48  -98.20  -30.02  -86.86  -31.44  -95.59
NTAL  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.
LAC  -12.29  -35.52  -15.19  41.96  -14.14  40.21
TAL  4.41  -32.28  -8.94  41.06  -7.47  -38.75
NTAL  -51.69  46.46  47.52
MENA  9.74  -3.96  -1.68  -28.37  6.42  -10.43
TAL  -7.09  -25.35  -18.97  -54.55  -11.42  -33.89
NTAL  60.24  50.16  59.94
SSA  1.02  -16.57  1.62  -18.99  1.64  -16.25
TAL  4.98  -14.90  5.60  -17.70  5.80  -14.33
NTAL  -29.35  -28.84  -31.64
TAL: Trade  Adjustment  Lending  Countries,  NTAL: Non Trade  Adjustment  Lending  Countries,  LAC: Latin  America  and  the
Caribbean  MENA: Middle  East  and  North Africa,  and  SSA: Sub Saharan  Africa. See Appendix  for Data definitions  and  sources.
Table 4: Average Rankings by region
Per Capita  Model  (PC)  % of GDP Model (PG)
1980-82  1990-92  Change  1980-82  1990-92  Change
ASIA  23  18  5  20  17  3
TAL  22  19  3  22  16  6
NTAL  24  17  7  17  19  -2
EUROPE  25  38  -13  25  38  -13
TAL  22  37  -15  23  36  -14
NTAL  30  41  -11  31  42  -12
LAC  41  43  -2  44  44  0
TAL  40  42  -2  42  42  -1
NTAL  46  46  1  53  51  2
MENA  44  40  4  42  41  1
TAL  45  39  7  42  36  6
NTAL  42  41  1  42  48  -6
SSA  41  40  1  41  39  1
TAL  41  38  2  40  37  3
NTAL  45  53  -9  45  51  -6
Average
Dev Countries  37  37  0  37  37  0
TAL  37  37  0  37  36  1
NTAL  37  37  0  37  41  4
TAL: Trade  Adjustment  Lending  Countries,  NTAL:  Non Trade  Adjustment  Lending  Countries,  LAC: Latin America  and  the Caribbean,
MENA.  Middle  East and  North  Africa,  and SSA: Sub Saharan  Africa. See text and  appendix  for model  specifications.
18Apnendix 1: Countries and Re2ions
Regions/Groups  Sub-groups  Countries
ASIA  TAL  Bangladesh, China, Korea, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea,
Philippines, Thailand
N-TAL  India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka
EUROPE  TAL  Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Yugoslavia
N-TAL  Greece, Portugal
LAC  TAL  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,
Panama, Uruguay, Venezuela
N-TAL  Dominican Republic, Haiti, Paraguay, Peru
MENA  TAL  Jordan, Algeria,  Morocco, Tunisia
N-TAL  Oman, Syrian Arab Republic, Republic of Yemen, Egypt
SSA  TAL  Benin, Burundi,  Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire,
Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria,  Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
Tanzania,
Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia,  Zimbabwe
N-TAL  Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Liberia,
Rwanda, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland
TAL: Trade Adjustment Lending  Countries, NTAL: Non Trade Adjustment Lending Countries, LAC: Latin America and the  Caribbean,
MENA:  Middle East and North Africa, and SSA: Sub Saharan Africa.
Number  TAL  Non-TAL  Total
ASIA  7  6  13
EUROPE  4  2  6
LAC  16  4  20
MENA  4  4  8
SSA  30  11  41
Total  61  27  88
19Appendix 2:  Trade Intensity Regression Results:
See Appendix 3 for variable definitions and sources
x  Model: Per Capita Model (1990-92)
Dependent Variable: LNXCAP
Root MSE  0.80603  R-square  0.7308
DeD  Mean  4.48788  Adj R-sq  0.7150
C.l.  17.96009
Parameter Estimates
Parameter  Standard  T for HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter=0  Prob . Ti
INTERCEPT  1  -1.914155  1.33314189  -1.436  0.1556
GDPCAP  1  1.232745  0.09644314  12.782  0.0001
LNPOP  1  -0.109333  0.07022402  -1.557  0.1241
XMCAP  1  -0.000811  0.00024164  -3.358  0.0013
WDIST  1  -0.287085  0.62194463  -0.462  0.6458
x  Model: Percentage of GDP Model (1990-92)
Dependent Variable: LNNXGDP
Root MSE  0.74302  R-square  0.2941
Dep Mean  2.28932  Adj R-sq  0.2526
C.V  32.45575
Parameter Estimates
Parameter  Standard  T for HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter=0  Prob > ITI
INTERCEPT  1  3.817564  1.26147436  3.026  0.0035
LGDPCAP  1  0.169402  0.08267847  2.049  0.0443
LNPOP  1  -0.140727  0.06513671  -2.160  0.0343
XMGDP  1  -0.041094  0.00817093  -5.029  0.0001
WDIST  1  -0.298465  0.56616950  -0.527  0.5998
x  Model: Per Capita Model (1980-82)
Dependent Variable: LNXCAP
Root MSE  0.91033  R-square  0.5261
Dep Mean  4.26550  Adj R-sq  0.4982
C.VM  21.34160
Parameter Estimates
Parameter  Standard  T for HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter=0  Prob>  ITI
INTERCEP  1  0.952294  1.53839749  0.619  0.5380
LGDPCAP  1  0.955871  0.12007169  7.961  0.0001
LNPOP  1  -0.179762  0.07848313  -2.290  0.0251
XMCAP  1  -0.000810  0.00025216  -3.212  0.0020
WDIST  1  -0.210637  0.68895996  -0.306  0.7607
x  Model: Percentage of GDP Model (1980-82)
Dependent Variable: LNNXGDP
Root MSE  0.83197  R-square  0.3222
Dep Mean  2.16972  Adj R-sq  0.2823
C.V  38.34479
Parameter Estimates
Parameter  Standard  T for HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter=0  Prob > ITI
INTERCEPT  1  6.770444  1.42770633  4.742  0.0001
LGDPCAP  1  -0.060069  0.10338999  -0.581  0.5632
LNPOP  1  -0.232360  0.07313389  -3.177  0.0022
XMGDP  1  -0.046902  0.00924012  -5.076  0.0001
WDIST  1  -0.212427  0.62297018  -0.341  0.7342
20ADDendix  3: Data Sources and Definitions
REER: Real Effective Exchange Rates (1980 = 100); from IECTRD/BESD Database.  Data were not
available for Yugoslavia, Dominican Rap., Haiti, Jordan, Oman, Angola, Benin, Guinea Bissau,
Liberia.
M, CM, NFCM, NFM, and CON: Total Imports, Consumption Imports, Non-food Consumption
Imports, Non-food Imports, and Total Consumption respectively; from IECTRD/BESD Database.
Consumption Imports (CM) are defined as foods, textiles, and other manufactures imports.  Data on
most variables were not available for Yemen Rep., Botwana, Guinea, Lesotho, Mozambique, Rwanda,
Swaziland.
BMP: Black Market Premium.  Defined as the percentage difference between the parallel (black
market) market rate and the official exchange rate.  Black market rates are from the International
Currency Analysis, Inc. (Various years), Official exchange rates are from BESD Database.  No data
were available for Papua New Guinea, Bolivia, Brazil, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Oman, Yemen Rep.,
Angola, Guinea Bissau, Seychelles.
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